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Abstract
Background: The United States (U.S.) Food and Drug Administration, as protectors of public health, encourages
generic drug development and use so that patients can access affordable medications. The FDA, however, has
limited mechanisms to encourage generic drug manufacturing.
Main results: Generic drug manufacturers make decisions regarding development of products based on expected
profitability, influenced by market forces, features of the reference listed drug, and manufacturing capabilities, as
well as regulatory restrictions. Barriers to the development of generic drugs include the challenge of demonstrating
bioequivalence of some products, particularly those that are considered to be complex generics.
Conclusions: We present here a focused review describing the influences on generic manufacturers who are
prioritizing drugs for generic development. We also review proposed strategies that regulators may use to
incentivize generic drug development.
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Background
The use of generic drugs products typically yields lower
costs to insurers and patients than use of branded prod-
ucts. Efforts to increase generic drug utilization have
proven helpful in reducing healthcare spending in the
United States (U.S.) [1]. According to the most recent
report from the Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
generic drugs accounted for 88 % of all dispensed retail
prescriptions in the U.S in 2014, while consuming only
28 % of total drug spending [2]. The use of generics,
where available, is estimated to have saved the U.S.
healthcare system $1.68 trillion between 2005 and 2014,
with $254 billion saved in 2014 alone [2]. Patent expir-
ation for a number of blockbuster drugs from 2010 to
2014, followed by the launch of generic equivalents, has
played an important role in healthcare cost savings.
Despite evidence that generic drugs bring value to the
healthcare system, these products are not uniformly
valuable to their manufacturers. Manufacturers are appro-
priately deliberate about investing in the development of
generic products. The United States (U.S.) Food and Drug
Administration, as protectors of public health, encourages
generic drug development and use so that patients can ac-
cess affordable medications; however, the FDA has few
mechanisms to incentivize generic manufacturing. Herein,
we present a review aimed at exploring the forces that
limit the development and production of generics in the
U.S. and the ways in which the FDA could conceivably re-
duce barriers to the development of generic drugs. Our
objective was to review the influences on manufacturers,
which are the parties responsible for prioritizing drugs for
generic development, as well as the strategies that regula-
tors may use to incentivize generic drug development in
the U.S.
Pathways to generic drug development
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, often referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act,
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to cre-
ate an abbreviated pathway for the approval of new drugs
that are therapeutically equivalent to a branded drug [1].
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Under this Act, a manufacturer needs only to demonstrate
the bioequivalence of a generic product to a reference
listed drug through an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA), rather than repeating the costly and time con-
suming safety and efficacy studies required of innovative,
new chemical entities [3–5]. The FDA considers a generic
drug to be bioequivalent to the reference listed drug if the
rate and extent of absorption of the generic drug do not
show a significant difference from the rate and extent of
absorption of the listed drug when administered at the
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under simi-
lar experimental conditions in either a single dose or mul-
tiple doses [3]. Pharmaceutically equivalent drugs are
products with the same active ingredients, dosage form,
strength, and route of administration. Of these, those
proven to be bioequivalent are consequently considered
therapeutically equivalent or substitutable - with the ex-
pectation that they have the same safety and efficacy pro-
file. Once the FDA approves the ANDA and the branded
version is no longer protected by patent or market exclu-
sivity, the generic product can be brought to market.
When identifying a new development target, generic
manufacturers first seek an informed perspective on the
competitive landscape about potential generic competitors
before prioritizing resources and making a decision to
proceed [6]. Strategies for generics development have
evolved rapidly, responding to market dynamics [7]. Be-
tween 1984 and 2012, generic manufacturers focused
largely on the production of “simple” to formulate small
molecules, and won the market via mass production. The
years between 2012 and 2017 have been called the “patent
cliff”, when many drugs considered to have been “block-
buster drugs’ lost, or will soon lose, their patent protec-
tion. This opened important opportunities for generic
manufacturers, who commonly apply one or more strat-
egies. The first is the “portfolio-centric approach”. Generic
manufacturers include re-innovation design (i.e., the
process of producing the next generation of generics with
revised and refined features of successfully-launched prod-
ucts) in their portfolio ostensibly to provide personalized,
cost-effective generic products that meet the demand of
healthcare systems, policymakers, and patients [8]. One
way is through what is called re-innovation or sometimes
called the production of “super generics”. The products
have modifications beyond the originator generic; these
often require a submission to FDA of a new drug applica-
tion rather than an ANDA. An example is the generic
drug, abraxane, which the manufacturer expected to gain
market share over paclitaxel. The active ingredient, pacli-
taxel, is unchanged but abraxane has the molecule coated
in albumin, allowing the company to claim fewer adverse
reactions for the patient [9, 10]. The second is the “thera-
peutic area dominance”. With this approach, generic man-
ufacturers compete within a specialized area of generic
drugs such as cardiovascular, oncology, or rheumatology
drugs [11]. For example, Relax Pharmaceuticals (an Indian
generic manufacture) specializes in the manufacturing of
generic antibiotics and gastrointestinal products. Finally,
market experts have predicted that after 2017, when many
branded drugs have lost their patent protection, generic
manufacturers will shift resources to the production of
complex generics such as drug/device combinations and
sterile injectables, or may move into the marketplace for
biosimilar products [5, 12].
Manufacturing considerations
When generic manufacturers are selecting products for
development, the expectation of an adequate return on
investment is the foremost consideration. This can be
forecast, to some extent, by knowing the demand for the
product and the requirements for production.
Market forces
Generic manufacturers understandably focus on drugs
with a potential for high profit. Companies are often inter-
ested in developing a generic if the branded medication
has a high average wholesale price, which is expected to
translate into a profitable generic. Similarly, chronic dis-
eases, with a larger population health burden, are also
often targeted areas for generic manufacturers. For ex-
ample, cardiovascular and central nervous system diseases
are the two largest market segments, composing nearly
38 % of the global generic pharmaceutical market together
[13, 14]. Generic manufacturers may also choose to avoid
densely populated therapeutic classes, when deciding
whether to join the competition.
Features of reference listed drug
The Hatch-Waxman Act defined single-dose pharmacoki-
netic studies as the method of establishing bioequivalence
for systemically acting drug products. However, there are
formulations or routes of administration where systemic
blood levels cannot be used to determine bioequivalence,
such as when the product is not intended to be systemic-
ally active. Therefore, drugs that are used topically in the
eye; or dosage forms intended to act within the gastro-
intestinal tract lumen without absorption, do not have
clear paths for demonstrating bioequivalence, which is a
major deterrent to their production. The FDA has made
significant progress in defining bioequivalence methodolo-
gies for many of these non-systemically active drug prod-
ucts; [15] however, a number of products remain without
clearly defined methodology, including inhaled drug prod-
ucts and transdermal preparations. This impacts the pro-
duction of generics for inhaled corticosteroids, such as for
asthma treatment, and transdermal testosterone for hor-
mone replacement, as examples. In the absence of
product-specific guidance, drug developers may ask the
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FDA development questions via the controlled corres-
pondence process or request to meet with FDA scientists
in pre-ANDA meetings. Sponsors also may develop their
own analytical tools and study protocols through which
they can demonstrate bioequivalence, and then work with
the FDA for approval of their plan [2].
Manufacturing capabilities of complex drugs
Generic manufacturers also consider their technical ability
to manufacture generic versions of branded products. They
evaluate the complexity of the manufacturing that is needed
to produce a generic equivalent, the cost of manufacturing,
and their own research and development capabilities. For
example, small molecule pharmaceutical products are sim-
pler to create and therefore are more likely to be developed
generically than complex large molecules. Dosage form also
may play a role in generic drug development; solid oral
forms (e.g., tablets, capsules) and parenteral solutions have
a higher likelihood of being easily developed than more
complex drug delivery systems (again, inhaled products,
topical products). These differences are due to techno-
logical barriers and manufacturers’ capabilities. For
example, the drug delivery system development process is
particularly complicated for inhaled products with manu-
facturers needing to work around the bans on ozone-
depleting propellants and the multiple patents on
hydrofluorocarbon-free devices. Generic manufacturers
need sufficient research and development resources to
manufacture these technically challenging generic products.
Innovative products have become increasingly complex
and, necessarily, so have their generic equivalents [16]. Each
complex generic is “complex” in its own way [17, 18]
(Table 1). The development of complex generics requires
substantial commitment from the manufacturer, which
may lower the benefit to cost ratio for its production. The
manufacturer may be asked to repeat clinical studies due to
the challenges of demonstrating bioequivalence for these
products or do additional physiochemical characterization
testing [11]. Furthermore, for complex generics the path-
way to drug approval may differ substantially from one
product to another product; [13] the FDA’s Office of Gen-
eric Drugs (OGD) manages each submission on a case-by-
case basis. Complex generics are expected to eventually be-
come a significant percentage of the generic market, but
the approval challenges first must be overcome.
Materials challenges
Some generic products are challenging to develop be-
cause of inadequate source raw materials, although this
is not unique to generics. The International Conference
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Regis-
tration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use guidelines are
the main instructions for sourcing qualified raw mate-
rials for any drug manufacturing [19]. Drugs with car-
cinogenicity or toxicities may require suitable handling
conditions in clinical practice and during development,
which may be a deterrent to production, particularly if
the return on investment cannot be assured [20, 21].
Regulatory considerations
180-day exclusivity period
The Hatch-Waxman Act gave additional protection to
the inventors of innovative, new drugs by lengthening
patent terms and by providing guaranteed periods of
data exclusivity (5 years for a new chemical entity). The
Act, in return, offers the first generic manufacturer to
file an ANDA a 180-day period of market exclusivity. An
effect of this regulation, however, is that the exclusivity
period prevents other generic manufacturers from bring-
ing their generic product to market during this time.
This is typically not advantageous for consumers be-
cause it is not until roughly six generic products are
available that the full cost savings of generics are typic-
ally realized; although the largest price decrease occurs
with the entry of the second product [22].
Pay for delay
The 180-day exclusivity advantage provided to generic
manufactures under the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages
generic manufacturers to challenge the existing patents
of brand manufacturers (“the Paragraph IV challenges”).
It has, however, also encouraged generic drug manufac-
turers to settle and accept compensations from brand
manufacturers for their delaying entry into the market
[16]. This is counter to forces that encourage generic de-
velopment and introduction to the market. Kesselheim
describes studies measuring the impact of the Hatch-
Waxman act; he notes that there are no well-controlled
studies of the economic impact of Paragraph IV chal-
lenges and the effect of settlements on generic drug
availability and public health outcomes [23].
These settlements have taken the form of a cash pay-
ment (so called “pay for delay”) to reimburse some or all
of a generic manufacturer’s legal fees, or non-cash deals
where the brand manufacturer agrees to purchase their
product’s active ingredients from the generic manufac-
turer or not to market their own generic version of the
product (i.e., an authorized generic) for a period of time
[21]. In one notable case of cash payments, Cephalon
made reverse payments totaling $300 million dollars to
Table 1 Complex generics examples [11]
Complex Active Ingredients Peptides, complex mixtures, natural source
products
Complex Formulations Liposomes and iron colloids
Complex Route of Delivery Locally acting drugs
Complex Drug-Device
Combinations
Metered dose inhaled products and
transdermal systems
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four generic drug manufacturers to drop patent chal-
lenges and suspend marketing of generic versions of
Cephalon’s drug Provigil for six years. During that time,
Cephalon earned an additional $4 billion dollars in sales
for Provigil [24]. This was later found to be unlawful by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the basis of
these settlements being anticompetitive.
Pay for delay has posed a threat to the timely develop-
ment of generic drugs and a substantial cost to the U.S.
healthcare system. According to an FTC study, these
deals cost consumers and taxpayers $3.5 billion in higher
drug costs each year [25]. In 2013, there were more than
100 settlements reached between brand and generic
manufacturers. In a suit filed by the FTC against the
pharmaceutical company, Actavis, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in 2013 that reverse payments are subject to
U.S. antitrust laws [26]. Larger penalties to brand manu-
facturers, as well as generic manufacturers who accept
such payments, may be needed to dissuade settlements
that delay the availability of generic products. Hemphill
and Lemley described a strategy called earning exclusiv-
ity that they proposed would improve the effect of the
Hatch-Waxman Act on encouraging generic drug devel-
opment [27]. They suggested that under the strategy of
earning exclusivity, generic manufacturers would have to
earn the 180-day exclusivity offered by FDA by success-
fully defeating the weak or bad patents on the branded
products, without settlements. This would be done by
demonstrating that the patent was invalid or by demon-
strating that the generic product does not infringe upon
the existing patent. Barr won an exclusive marketing
rights challenge against Lilly for the production of a gen-
eric version of Prozac in 2000, which was 2 years before
the patent was expected to expire [28].
Access to the branded reference products
Manufacturers, necessarily, must have access to the ref-
erence listed reference drug to perform the bioequiva-
lence testing that the FDA requires of a generic product
under an ANDA [29]. There have been instances, how-
ever, of brand manufacturers preventing generic manu-
facturers from accessing their product [23]. Some brand
manufacturers have used the restrictions in their Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), and other
restricted access programs, to prevent generic manufac-
turers from accessing brand drug samples for testing.
These manufacturers have argued that they cannot pro-
vide generic manufacturers with samples of such REMS-
covered products because doing so would be outside the
FDA-sanctioned, restricted distribution pathway [30].
The Fair Access for Safe and Timely (FAST) Generics
Act, first proposed in Congress in September 2014, was
considered a solution to this REMS barrier [31]. The
FAST Generics Act would create a pathway for generic
manufacturers to secure a branded drug from its maker,
wholesaler, or specialty distributor regardless of whether
the product was subject to REMS, and impose stiff pen-
alties for non-compliance. Ultimately, the branded drugs
and their generic equivalents would then share a single
REMS. At the time of writing, neither the House nor
Senate has passed the FAST Generics Act [32].
Strategies for promoting generic drug utilization and
development
In order to encourage generic drug development, two
strategies have been frequently proposed by researchers
and policymakers: implementing initiatives or reforms to
increase generic utilization (thereby stimulating the gen-
eric economy by inducing demand) and offering aids or
incentives for generic drug innovations [9, 33].
Godman and his colleagues proposed a 4 “E” method-
ology (Education, Engineering, Economics and Enforce-
ment) for developing initiatives to increase generic drug
utilization in Europe [8] (Table 2). Initiatives focusing on
“Education” are usually programs that influence generic
prescribing by disseminating educational materials. Ini-
tiatives that focus on organizational interventions (“En-
gineering”) include agreements on price and volume of
existing drugs or disease management programs. Finan-
cial incentives (“Economics”) are for increasing generic
drug utilization through the use of positive and negative
incentives for physicians and patients. Finally, regulatory
or law enforcement (“Enforcement”) methods may in-
clude mandatory generic substitution laws to which
pharmacists must adhere. Some of these initiatives can
benefit generic utilization in the U.S., while others may
face unique challenges in the U.S. marketplace.
Indeed, the U.S. healthcare system has mechanisms that
promote generic usage. For example, most insurance com-
panies incentivize patients to use generic drugs by requir-
ing less cost-sharing for generic versus branded products.
In addition, 14 states currently have mandatory generic
substitution laws for pharmacists and the remainder, ex-
cept Oklahoma, have laws permitting substitution by
pharmacists [34]. However, it is unlikely that federal laws
promoting generic substitution will be enacted due to the
organization of the U.S. legal system, and “engineering”
Table 2 Strategies for increasing generics development and
utilization: the four “E” method [8]
Education Educational materials: treatment guidance and
educational outreach visit
Engineering Organizational interventions: agreements on price and
volume of existing drugs
Economics Financial incentives: positive and negative incentives for
physicians
Enforcement Regulatory or law enforcement: mandatory generic
substitution laws
Lee et al. Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:26 Page 4 of 6
initiatives may be challenging given the fragmented nature
of the U.S. healthcare system. Evidence is needed about
the effects on generic development and utilization of those
initiatives already in place, and future research should
assess the potential impact of supplemental initiatives
such as those involving education of patients and health
care providers.
The above activities are promising but all hinge upon
the production of new generic products. With more
complicated branded products losing their patent pro-
tection, bioequivalence methodologies for complex drugs
or dosage forms need to be developed. Guidance docu-
ments with updated standards or reference documents
from the FDA may encourage generic manufacturers to
proceed with the development of new products [8, 35].
Regular engagement with OGD may help drug manufac-
turers contain costs and decrease time-to-market delays.
The OGD now has provisions to grant pre-ANDA meet-
ings for complex generics [36].
Conclusions
We have described in this review select U.S. federal pol-
icies, and described the regulatory environment and
market forces influencing generic developers. Generic
drug developers choose candidate drugs based on the
market forces, features of the reference listed drug, and
manufacturing capabilities, as well as regulatory restric-
tions. With suitable policy and regulatory incentives to
increase generic utilization or facilitate the generic drug
development process, as described, generic manufac-
turers may be encouraged to develop new generic drugs
that will help increase access to medications, improve
population health, and contain healthcare spending.
Abbreviations
ANDA: Abbreviated new drug application; FAST: Fair Access for Safe and
Timely; FDA: Food and Drug Administration; FTC: Federal Trade Commission;
OGD: Office of Generic Drugs; REMS: Risk evaluation and mitigation strategy
Acknowledgements
We have no additional contributors to acknowledge in this manuscript.
Funding
Dr. Jodi Segal, Dr. Robert Romanelli, and Ms. Lee were funded by the Food
and Drug Administration through grant U01FD005267. Ms. Chen was not
funded for her work on this project.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Authors’ contributions
CYL - Prepared a first draft of the manuscript. XC - Provided additional
background research and drafted sections of the manuscript. RR - Provided
critical suggestions and edited the final manuscript. JS - Conceived of the
manuscript, drafted sections, and did the final editing. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Author details
1Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for
Drug Safety and Effectiveness, 624 N. Broadway, Room 644, Baltimore, MD
21205, USA. 2Palo Alto Medical Foundation Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
USA. 3Division of General Internal Medicine, Johns Hopkins University School
of Medicine, 624 N. Broadway, Room 644, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA.
Received: 20 May 2016 Accepted: 10 September 2016
References
1. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. ASPE issue brief. Expanding the use
of generic drugs. 2010. Retrieved from https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/
expanding-use-generic-drugs.
2. Anonymous, Generic Pharmaceutical Association. Generic drug savings in
the U.S.: Seventh annual edition: 2015. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.
gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report_2015.pdf.
3. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Guidance for
industry: bioavailability and bioequivalence studies for orally administered drug
products – general considerations. 2003. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3995B1_07_GFI-BioAvail-BioEquiv.pdf.
4. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Guidance for
industry: bioavailability and bioequivalence studies submitted in NDAs or INDs
— general considerations. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/
UCM389370.pdf.
5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Guidance
for industry: bioequivalence studies with pharmacokinetic endpoints for
drugs submitted under an ANDA. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/
ucm377465.pdf.
6. Ashburn TT, Thor KB. Drug repositioning: identifying and developing new
uses for existing drugs. Nat Rev Drug Discov. 2004;3(8):673–83.
7. Barei F, Le Pen C, Simoens S. The generic pharmaceutical industry: moving
beyond incremental innovation towards re-innovation. Generics Biosimilar J.
2013;2(1):13–9.
8. Ding M, Dong S, Eliashberg J, Gopalakrishnan A. Portfolio management in new
drug development. In: Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry.
New York: Springer; 2014. p. 83–118.
9. Ross MS. Innovation strategies for generic drug companies: moving into
supergenerics. IDrugs. 2010;13(4):243–7.
10. Barei F, Le Pen C, Simoens S. The generic pharmaceutical industry: moving
beyond incremental innovation towards re-innovation. Generics Biosimilars
Initiat J. 2013;2(1):13–9.
11. Von Koeckritz K. Generic drug trends—What’s next? Pharm Times. 2012;
78(4):78. Retrieved from http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/
2012/april2012/generic-drug-trends-whats-next--.
12. McKinsey & Company, Global Generics Interest Group. Generating value in
generics: finding the next five years of growth. 2013. Retrieved from http://
www.pharmatalents.es/assets/files/generating_value.pdf.
13. Godman B, Shrank W, Andersen M, et al. Comparing policies to enhance
prescribing efficiency in Europe through increasing generic utilization:
changes seen and global implications. Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes
Res. 2010;10(6):707–22.
14. Chidambaram A. Global generic pharmaceutical market – Qualitative and
quantitative analysis. 2013. Pharma Tech 2013 Conference. Retrieved from
http://www.slideshare.net/AiswariyaChidambaram/pharma-tech-2013-
aiswariya-chidambaram-fs.
15. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Product-specific recommendations for
generic drug development. 2016. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm075207.htm.
Lee et al. Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:26 Page 5 of 6
16. Srinivasan A. Complex generics: maximizing FDA approval potential. 2015.
Retrieved from https://www.parexel.com/files/6714/3076/9385/
ComplexGenerics_WPApril2015_final.pdf.
17. Sario N. Prescription drug market: the world is turning to generics. Market
realist. 2015. Retrieved from http://marketrealist.com/2015/03/analyzing-
prescription-market-branded-generic-drugs/.
18. Lionberger R. Complex Generic Drugs. GPhA Fall Technical Meeting, Bethesda,
MD. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/ucm374191.pdf.
19. Bowman D. A quick guide for sourcing biopharmaceutical raw materials.
BioProcess international. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.bioprocessintl.
com/upstream-processing/biochemicals-raw-materials/quick-guide-sourcing-
biopharmaceutical-raw-materials/.
20. Shargel L, Kanfer I, editors. Generic drug product development: solid
oral dosage forms. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients. Chapter 2. New
York: CRC Press; 2013. p. 19–21.
21. American Society of Health-System Pharmacists. ASHP guidelines on handling
hazardous drugs. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 2006;63(1):1172–93.
22. Wiske CP, Ogbechie OA, Schulman KA. Options to promote generics markets
in the Unites States. JAMA. 2015;314(20):2129–30.
23. Kesselheim AS. An empirical review of major legislation affecting drug
development: past experiences, effects, and unintended consequences.
Milbank Q. 2011;89(3):450–502.
24. Federal Trade Commission. Settlement of Cephalon pay for delay case ensures
$1.2 billion in Ill-gotten gains relinquished; refunds will go to purchasers
affected by anticompetitive tactics. 2015. Press release. Retrieved from https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-
delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill.
25. Federal Trade Commission. Agreements filed with the Federal Trade Commission
under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003. 2013. Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-
drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf.
26. Supreme Court of the United States. Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis,
Inc. October term, 2012 No. 12–416. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-416_m5n0.pdf.
27. Hemphill CS, Lemley MA. Earning exclusivity: generic drug incentives and
the Hatch-Waxman Act. Antitrust Law J. 2011;77(3):947–89.
28. Mclean B. Bitter Pill Prozac made Eli Lilly. Then along came a feisty generic
maker called Barr Labs. Their battle gives new meaning to the term 'drug
war. 2001. Accessed at http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/2001/08/13/308077/index.htm.
29. Sarpatwari A, Kesselheim AS. Ensuring timely approval of generic drugs.
Health Affairs Blog. 2015. Retrieved from http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/
03/24/ensuring-timely-approval-of-generic-drugs/.
30. Brill A. Lost prescription drug savings from use of REMS programs to delay
generic market entry. 2014. Matrix Global Advisors, Retrieved from http://www.
gphaonline.org/media/cms/REMS_Studyfinal_July2014.pdf.
31. The 114th Congress. 1ST Session. H.R.2841. FAST Generics Act of 2015. 2015.
Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2841/BILLS-114hr2841ih.pdf.
32. Anonymous. Fast generics act reintroduced in congress. 2015. Retrieved
from http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2015/
september2015/fast-generics-act-reintroduced-in-congress.
33. Kaló Z, Holtorf AP, Alfonso-Cristancho R, Shen J, Ágh T, Inotai A, Brixner D.
Need for multicriteria evaluation of generic drug policies. Value Health.
2015;18(2):346–51.
34. Survey of Pharmacy Law – 2015. Mount prospect. IL: National Association of
Boards of Pharmacy; 2014.
35. Boehm G, Yao L, Han L, Zheng Q. Development of the generic drug industry
in the US after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. Acta Pharm Sin B. 2013;3(5):
297–311.
36. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Lionberger R. GDUFA regulatory science
update. GPhA annual meeting. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/forindustry/userfees/genericdruguserfees/ucm434325.pdf.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Lee et al. Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:26 Page 6 of 6
